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Will Atlantic Pact Assure Western Security?

WASHINGTON—Disappointment in the effectiveness of the United Nations inspired the United States and its prospective treaty partners to negotiate the North Atlantic pact, the text of which the State Department published on March 18. At the heart of the issue as to whether the pact would be a desirable or an inadequate addition to American foreign policy, therefore, lies the question whether it will be effective where the UN has been ineffective. If the pact succeeds, it will give the world—at least the Western world—the sense of security which the fathers of the UN hoped their organization would create.

The Treaty and Russia

The measure of the effectiveness of the pact will be the influence which it exerts on Russia, since the basic problem of the UN is the Soviet problem. The UN "is not working as effectively as we hoped because one of its members has attempted to prevent it from working," Secretary of State Acheson said on March 18. "By obstructive tactics and the misuse of the veto, the Soviet Union has seriously interfered with the work of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security." The Truman administration apparently assumes that it can restore the UN to vitality if Russia can be steered to a foreign policy of active co-operation with the West, and it relies on the pact to pilot Russia by remote control in that direction.

The chief source of strength for the West in the treaty is the assertion in Article 5 that "the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them

in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." The State Department trusts that the sense of unity and identity of interest expressed in this clause will announce to the world that the United States will participate from the outset in any new great European war instead of waiting as it did from 1914 to 1917 and from 1939 to 1941. The treaty does not require the signatories to go to war when any one of them is attacked, however, although they agree to consult when one of them believes its territorial integrity, political independence or security "is threatened."

The signers undertake to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack"; to report any armed attack "and all measures taken as a result thereof . . . immediately . . . to the Security Council"; to leave to the Security Council "the primary responsibility . . . for the maintenance of international peace and security"; to refrain from entering into "any international engagement in conflict with this treaty"; to establish a council which would consider matters concerning the implementation of the treaty and would establish a subsidiary defense committee to work out a Western strategic plan for countering an armed attack; and to "eliminate conflict in their international economic policies." The treaty is to continue for twenty years; but the signers would be free to recommend revisions at the end of ten. The initial signers probably will be the United States, Canada, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway and Denmark, with Italy and

Portugal soon to follow. The act of signing is to take place on or about April 4. The Senate must approve it by a two-thirds majority vote.

Possible Effects of Treaty

The treaty has an obvious advantage over the UN for the signatories in one respect. Although the Soviet government has not implied that it plans to send its armed forces on a march across Europe to the sea, the Atlantic powers on the continent nevertheless have feared that such an attack was not utterly impossible, and the sense of danger, however remote in time, has fostered a sense of insecurity. The treaty would prepare the way for the United States and its European partners to halt an aggressor at the Rhine and at the center of Norway.

In this respect, if it is implemented sufficiently by joint armaments, it could be a strong deterrent to the launching of another major war between powers in Eastern and Western Europe. It could safeguard peace in Austria, where Western and Eastern occupying troops will continue to face one another if treaty talks now in progress in London fail. It could make safer the flights of the Western airlift planes into Berlin, for it specifies an armed attack on the signatories' occupying forces in Europe as cause for the operation of the treaty. The pact, in other words, would be effective as a Maginot Line, a diplomatic barrier beyond which the Soviet Union is not to extend its influence by military means. The UN has no facilities for setting such a line.

By securing the West from Eastern at-

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tack, however, the United States and its friends will not restrain the Soviet Union from following the policies which have distressed the signatories-elect in the past. It was the Communist party's seizure of the government in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 that awakened real interest in the United States in a North Atlantic pact. Public hostility in Western countries toward Russia mounted as a result of the trial and sentencing of Cardinal Mindszenty in Hungary. Both events took place in the sphere of Europe where Russia already has paramount influence, and nothing in the provisions of the pact,

which stresses only the territorial integrity and political independence of Western powers, could have deterred Russia from managing a coup in Czechoslovakia or a trial in Hungary.

The pact is so worded and its membership so limited that it might almost serve as an incitement to Russia to solidify its position in its sphere along the lines begun in Czechoslovakia, without danger of retaliation from abroad. The overthrow of Marshal Tito and his replacement with a government friendly to Moscow is a chronic possibility in Yugoslavia. Such a development would enormously strength-

en Russia without evoking the treaty. Moreover, while the pact does not provide a road for the West into the East, at the same time it does not bar Russia from increasing its influence in the West through the activities of the Communist parties, which remain strong in France and Italy. Since the pact leaves those and possibly other opportunities open to Russia, it could prove to be as disappointing as the UN if it were not for the notable possibility that it might save the Western world from the need for defending itself against attack and invasion.

BLAIR BOLLES

France Aspires To Western Union Leadership

PARIS—As the French, through economic recovery, regain confidence in themselves and in the future of their country, they begin to look beyond their borders for fields of activity in which France might come to play a larger and more constructive role than that which it has played since 1939 and, in effect, since 1919. The two fields to which the French look with most interest are the much discussed but as yet unrealized union of Western Europe, and the development of natural resources in France's overseas possessions, notably in Africa, which are no longer talked of as "colonies" but as parts of the French Union (Union Française).

Prospects for Western Union

The prevailing French view is that a union of Western Europe must be formed and that France has always been in the vanguard of movements for European federation (the name of Briand being invariably mentioned in this connection). The French also feel that Britain cannot be expected to take an active part in union projects, partly because of its traditional division of interests between the continent of Europe and its overseas ties with the Empire and the Dominions, partly because of what is considered here the "Little Englandism" of the Labor government. Given these premises, it is believed here that France, rather than Britain, will be called upon to play the leading role in the foundation of a Western Union. Such a role would accord well with the influence France once exercised on the continent—although obviously this influence would now be shorn of the military power commanded by the French in past centuries.

Should Britain continue to seem luke-

warm toward Western Union, the French suggest the creation of a union nucleus through closer ties with Italy (whose Foreign Minister, Count Sforza, has been an eloquent spokesman for the project) and, surprising as this may seem barely four years after the war, with Germany. But, and this is an important qualification, the French would like to see German states—not a single centralized German nation—become members of a Western Union. Hence their desire to have the union formed before the creation of a single West German state.

The problems of Western political union are further complicated, from the French point of view, by what they regard as an important Franco-British divergency on economic co-operation among Western nations receiving ERP aid and associated in the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) with its headquarters in Paris. Actually the much publicized conflict between British "austerity" and French *joie de vivre* can be easily exaggerated. While it is true that the individualism and easygoing tendencies of the French would make it difficult for any government here to enforce the strict controls devised by Sir Stafford Cripps, it also seems less rational for the French, whose land produces practically all the foodstuffs they need, to tighten their belts in so-called time of peace, than it seems to Britons who have to import most of their food.

Nevertheless, it is only now, after nearly one year of the Marshall plan, that the OEEC is able to turn its attention from the task of merely co-ordinating the requirements of sixteen ERP nations for imports from the dollar area, to the far more thorny task of getting these na-

tions to agree on co-ordination of their industrial and agricultural production and of their plans for future investments—a prerequisite for achieving a workable balance of payments with the United States by 1952 when ERP is scheduled to end. It is essential that Americans should realize the manifold difficulties of effecting such a co-ordination between a number of nations, with firmly rooted interests of all kinds. It is already an important step forward that the OEEC countries have agreed to exchange economic and financial information which, in the past, had been guarded as national secrets. In view of this advance, it is hoped that the recently formed "council of eight," composed of top government officials like Cripps of Britain and Paul Henri Spaak of Belgium, will be able to solve at the highest level problems which technical experts had no authority to settle. But even with the best intentions, and under the most favorable circumstances, an economic union of Western Europe cannot be created overnight without disorganizing current production and wounding many susceptibilities.

New Overseas Horizons

In all national and inter-European economic discussions, plans for the development of resources in Africa and the further expansion of production in Southeast Asia, once that area has become politically stabilized, play an increasingly important part. It is striking to see the lively interest shown by the French concerning the investment of their own funds in African enterprises, both public and private. In part at least this is due to the belief of the French that, in case of another European conflict, their investments will be

safers in Africa than in France. Point Four of President Truman's Inaugural Address has aroused varying reactions here. The French would certainly welcome the opportunity of purchasing American machinery for their overseas territories, and believe they have much to offer the United States, for example, through the development of African iron deposits. At the same time they feel that Americans have not recognized the extent to which France and other colonial powers have already given technical aid and made capital investments in so-called backward areas; and they wonder whether the United States, under Point Four, may not seek a dominant role in the colonies which, in French opinion, would not only be unacceptable here, but might also have ill-effects on the pattern of economic de-

velopment already under way in these areas.

What About Russia?

As in the United States, all discussions of the international situation reflect preoccupation with the aims and methods of the U.S.S.R. and of communism. Here, even bitter opponents of communism believe that, aside from the Communist opportunistic maneuvers with which the French are very familiar, there is in the party a hard core of sincere, fervent men and women who are inspired by what is tantamount to religious faith, and therefore cannot be either discounted or denounced as mere scoundrels and traitors. Moreover, the French point out that, ever since the revolution of 1789, the people of France have always taken pride in mov-

ing *à la gauche* (to the left). French political experts go so far as to say that if the French Communists could convince the public that they no longer are tied to Moscow, they might well be accepted as simply the most active contemporary group of the Left. Meanwhile the French still have to be "shown" that the United States policy of "containing" Russia by the Truman Doctrine and the North Atlantic pact will, in reality, stop the U.S.S.R. They fear that, on the contrary, it may result in increasing Russian pressure on peripheral nations like Norway, Yugoslavia and Greece that would not take the form of actual war, but would indicate no "mellowing" on the part of Soviet leaders.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The last of three articles on current trends in France.)

British African Union Faces Hurdle On Native Rights

Britain's need to develop the resources of Africa and its search for new centers of imperial strength both play a part in the political and economic activities taking place along the Cape-to-Cairo route, so long the dream of Cecil Rhodes. The two terminal countries of this route—South Africa and Egypt—no longer take orders from London. But the red line between these two—up the eastern highland ridge of Africa which holds many of the continent's most promising agricultural and mineral resources—consists of seven territories in various states of political and economic development, all British.

Rhodesian Dominion?

Interest recently has focused on the southernmost three, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Delegates from the British settlements in these territories held an unofficial conference at Victoria Falls on the border between the two Rhodesias February 16 and 17 and passed by acclamation a resolution calling for the creation of a federal parliament. This resolution is to be followed by the drafting of a constitution, some form of a referendum which will take cognizance of the sentiments of the African as well as the white communities, and the submission of the results to the Colonial Office in London. Leaders of this movement talk of an eventual "eighth dominion," possibly in conjunction with the three East African territories of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika where another fusion movement is under way.

The main impetus for the Rhodesian federation comes from Southern Rhodesia, a colony which has had white self-government since 1923. The Victoria Falls conference followed Southern Rhodesian elections last September which returned Sir Godfrey Huggins as Prime Minister with an increased and decisive majority. Sir Godfrey, a surgeon who still operates occasionally, has been Premier for fifteen years, but his United party regime has been hampered since the end of the war by a powerful Liberal opposition which has objected to the government's participation in the colony's growing industry. The Liberals include many Afrikaners who have sympathies with the Nationalist regime in the neighboring Union of South Africa. The unexpected extent of the United party's victory is attributed to the influx of 30,000 British immigrants, including some from South Africa, in the last two years. This has increased the white population by a third.

The arguments for federation are essentially economic; the difficulties the movement faces stem from Africa's greatest problem—the future of the natives. Southern Rhodesia, the most developed of the three, produces gold, chrome iron ore, asbestos and coal; tobacco, maize and cattle are its primary agricultural products. Northern Rhodesia's main industry is copper mining, booming in response to world demand. Nyasaland, the least developed region, grows tobacco and tea for export. All three territories need capital investment, machinery, better transporta-

tion, more technical experts and some measure of industrialization. Northern Rhodesia requires greater refinery capacity to produce electrolytic copper; it needs more coal from the rich Wankie colliery in Southern Rhodesia and better transportation to and from the copper mines. Further agricultural development in the native reserves will not come easily; the problems involved include population pressure on the land, erosion, traditional peasant farming methods and sleeping sickness carried by the tsetse fly.

The three territories are landlocked, separated from the Indian Ocean on the east by Mozambique, a Portuguese colony. Southern Rhodesians have been negotiating with the Portuguese for the expansion of port facilities at Beira, Indian Ocean terminal of the Southern Rhodesian railway. Another possibility, long considered but costly, is the building of a rail link with British East Africa to the North. The three territories have been studying these development problems in a loose advisory organization, the Central African Council, founded in 1945.

Native Policies

The three territories might have formed a union before this if it were not for the conflict among themselves and with London over policies toward their African communities. A proposal made before World War II for amalgamation of the dependencies was turned down by the Colonial Office as the result of African fears in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland that union would mean the spread

of Southern Rhodesian native policies northward. Southern Rhodesian native legislation follows the same pattern of segregation and discrimination as that in the Union of South Africa. Under Southern Rhodesian "pass laws," all African males over fourteen must register and carry papers giving details of their employment. Property qualifications bar the natives from effective representation in the colony's parliament. There is evidence that Huggins, like Jan Christiaan Smuts, former Prime Minister of South Africa, represents a compromise between even more stringent legislation which some members of the white community favor and the possibility of progress toward greater rights and responsibilities for the natives. Huggins has stated his belief that "for a very long time to come" Central Africa must be governed by "an aristocracy in the best sense of the word."

The three territories are inhabited by some 5 million Africans and about 130,000 white settlers. Of the latter, 100,000 whites are in Southern Rhodesia, 30,000 in Northern Rhodesia (which is absorbing 4,000 to 5,000 new immigrants yearly), and 2,200 in Nyasaland. The native populations are approximately 1.7, 1.75 and 2.2 million respectively. Government in the two northern colonies follows the pattern elsewhere in the British Empire. Each is ruled by a governor, responsible to the Colonial Office, with the assistance of an executive council (corresponding to a cabinet) and a legislative council. Members of the colonial administration sit on both councils. In preparation for responsible cabinet government, the practice has been to introduce "unofficial members" first to the legislative council and then to the executive council. The first unofficial representatives, however, are elected by the European community and African representation follows at a later stage. The first two African representatives took seats in the Northern Rhodesian legislative council this year.

While this is a slow process of introducing the natives to political responsibilities, it at least provides for the possibility of African self-government in the future whereas the granting of complete political power to the European settlers,

Branch & Affiliate Meetings

BUFFALO, March 26, *North Atlantic Pact*,

S. Shepherd Jones

HARTFORD, March 29, *What U.S. Policy for Spain and Portugal?*; Olive Holmes

SYRACUSE, March 29, *Arctic Diplomacy*,
Hugh Keenleyside, Blair Bolles

UTICA, March 30, *World Plenty and Peace*, Blair Bolles

*CLEVELAND, March 31, April 1, 2, *UNESCO Conference*, Milton S. Eisenhower, George V. Allen, Jaime Torres Bodet, Sir Sarvapallit Radhakrishnan

*PHILADELPHIA, April 1, *United States Foreign Policy in the Mediterranean*, Francis Biddle, James Reston

BUFFALO, April 4, *Behind the Iron Curtain*, Julien Bryan

ST. PAUL, April 5, *Shall We Arm Western Europe?*, Blair Bolles

MINNEAPOLIS, April 6, *The North Atlantic Alliance*, Blair Bolles

MILWAUKEE, April 7, *Washington Views the World*, Blair Bolles

PHILADELPHIA, April 7, *The U.S. and the U.N.*

*Data taken from printed announcement

as in the Union of South Africa, may have the opposite effect. For this reason, the Colonial Office has not been enthusiastic about the Victoria Falls movement toward federation, pointing out London's duty toward native interests. The Rhodesian delegates have been careful to avoid this issue. Their proposed federation would have only limited power, and they hope to meet African and Colonial Office objections by leaving native policy where it now rests, in the hands of the separate governments of the three territories. This is an easy compromise on paper, but the intensified economic development of Central Africa, the motive for federation, cannot fail to have social implications which will result in African demands for better economic and political status.

WILLIAM W. WADE

(This is the first in a series of three articles on developments in British East and Central Africa.)

News in the Making

The East-West conflict over Germany was renewed when the Communist-dominated People's Council in the Soviet zone approved a "constitution for all Germany" providing for a highly centralized government. This was interpreted as a move to win German sympathies before the Bonn constitution, now being drafted by representatives from the Western zones, is completed. . . . Meanwhile, a committee of nine "neutral" members of the UN reported to the Security Council its failure to resolve four-power differences over the currency question in Berlin. The three Western powers subsequently on March 20 decreed that the West mark is to be the sole legal currency in the Western sectors of Berlin. The whole Berlin dispute may be brought before the UN General Assembly after it convenes on April 5. . . . Agreement on a four-year international wheat agreement was reached in Washington by five exporting nations (the United States, Australia, Canada, France and Uruguay) and forty-one importing countries. The treaty, which requires ratification, will cover 450 million bushels of wheat annually and provides for a ceiling price of \$1.80 a bushel and minimum prices graduated from \$1.50 the first year to \$1.20 the fourth. Although Russia participated in the negotiations, the Soviet Union did not become a party to the treaty because of its failure to win an export allocation of at least 75 million bushels in a proposed total of 500 million. . . . *Britain's Economic Survey for 1949* listed as a major objective for the coming year an increase of exports to the United States and Canada 50 per cent above the 1938 volume. Although the survey reported that Britain had almost reached an over-all balance of trade with the rest of the world, it warned that the "worst danger spot" in the economy was the persistent shortage of dollars.

Shalom Means Peace, by Robert St. John. New York, Doubleday, 1949. \$2.95

The author gives an inspiring and dramatic account of the struggle in Israel to create a homeland, and through personal stories, anecdotes and penetrating observations, reveals the imagination and courage of its people.

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